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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
  ____________ 
 
No. 10-3743 
____________ 
 
TAMARA ANTHONY, 
 
                                              Appellant 
 
v. 
 
DUFF & PHELPS CORPORATION; DUFF & PHELPS, LLC 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2-09-cv-03918) 
District Judge:  Honorable Paul S. Diamond 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 20, 2011 
 
Before:  HARDIMAN and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges  
and RESTANI *
 
 Judge. 
(Filed:  June 22, 2011) 
 
____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
                                                 
 *The Honorable Jane A. Restani, Judge of the United States Court of International 
Trade, sitting by designation. 
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 Tamara Anthony appeals the District Court’s summary judgment on her Title VII 
claim for national origin discrimination.  We will affirm, essentially for the reasons stated 
by the District Court in its careful and thorough opinion. 
I 
 Because we write for the parties, we recount only the essential facts, and we do so 
in the light most favorable to Anthony. 
 Anthony worked as a real estate analyst at Duff & Phelps, LLC from September 
2006 to June 2008.  As a Russian emigrant, Anthony claimed that she was being singled 
out for unfair treatment by her co-workers and supervisors.  Specifically, Anthony 
testified that one of her supervisors, Jay White, “constantly corrected” her pronunciation 
of English words and another supervisor, John Corbett, assigned her low-billable hour 
work “that nobody else seemed to want.”  In contrast, Anthony claims her direct 
supervisor, Paul Sipala, was a “fair and reasonable supervisor” who exhibited no obvious 
bias against persons of Russian origin. 
 In the spring of 2008, “as a result of the general economic downturn,” Duff & 
Phelps, LLC “implemented Project Pearl, a nationwide reduction-in-force.”  The 
company directed Ross Prindle, the national manager of the real estate group, to terminate 
one analyst position from the Philadelphia office.  At the time, two real estate analysts 
worked in Philadelphia: Anthony and an American-born college graduate, Robert 
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Wasenius.  Prindle had not met either candidate.  Accordingly, he relied on the company’s 
“utilization data”—measuring employee productivity and efficiency—to determine which 
employee to fire.  The data showed that “between January 1, 2007 and March 31, 2008, 
[Anthony’s] overall utilization score was 10-15% lower per year than Wasenius’s score.”  
 Prindle contacted Corbett to determine whether the employees’ utilization scores 
“grossly mischaracterized the overall quality of their respective work performance.”  
Corbett was unaware, during his conversation with Prindle, that the company was 
planning to lay off workers.  Believing that Prindle merely called to discuss the 
employees’ annual performance reviews, Corbett noted the analysts’ “good qualities and 
qualities that needed work.”  Corbett made no mention of either candidate’s national 
origin.  Following this conversation, Prindle selected Anthony for termination and she 
was officially notified of the company’s decision on June 9, 2008. 
 Two months later, Anthony filed suit in the District Court for the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania, alleging national origin discrimination in violation of Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.  The District Court entered summary 
judgment against Anthony on August 12, 2010, holding that she could not make out a 
prima facie case of discrimination.  This timely appeal followed.1
 
 
                                                 
 1 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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II 
 We review the District Court’s summary judgment de novo, and apply the same 
standard as the District Court.  Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 
2010). 
 The District Court found no “causal nexus” between Anthony’s membership in a 
protected class and her termination.  Anthony v. Duff & Phelps Corp., 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 83161, *18-19 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 12, 2010) (citing Sarullo v. U.S. Postal Serv., 352 
F.3d 789, 798 (3d Cir. 2003)).  The Court held that “it is counterintuitive to infer that 
[Prindle] discriminated [against Anthony]” based on her national origin, because there is 
no evidence that Prindle was aware of Anthony’s nationality at the time of her 
termination.  Id. at *16 (quoting Geraci v. Moody-Tottrup, Inc., 82 F.3d 578, 581 (3d Cir. 
1996)). 
 Anthony argues that because Prindle’s decision was based, in large part, on her 
supervisors’ recommendations, a “causal nexus” exists between her supervisors’ anti-
Russian bias and Prindle’s ultimate determination.  See Roebuck v. Drexel Univ., 852 
F.2d 715, 727 (3d Cir. 1988) (“it plainly is permissible for a jury to conclude that an 
evaluation at any level, if based on discrimination, influenced the decisionmaking 
process”). 
 The District Court rejected this argument, however, finding that Anthony failed to 
point to any evidence showing that her “supervisors (Corbett, Sipala, or White) . . . 
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influenced Prindle’s decision based upon an anti-Russian bias.” Anthony, 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 83161, at *17.  Apart from Anthony’s allegations that Corbett assigned less 
desirable work to her than he did to her co-workers, no evidence in the record shows that 
Corbett was motivated by discriminatory animus, let alone that he allowed such animus to 
infect his recommendations to Prindle.  Rather, Corbett testified that he did not 
recommend that Anthony be laid off, but rather spoke to Prindle about the employees’ 
2007 evaluations.  In 2007, Anthony received an overall competency score of 
“proficient”—the second lowest possible rating.2
 Nor is there evidence that White’s alleged bias against persons of Russian origin 
influenced Prindle’s decision to terminate Anthony.  During his deposition, White 
claimed that Prindle never contacted him to discuss Anthony’s performance.  
Nevertheless, Anthony argues that a reasonable jury might find that White was part of the 
decision making process, because Prindle claimed to speak to multiple “individuals,” but 
only identified one person by name.  We decline Anthony’s invitation to assume that one 
  Like Anthony’s “utilization data,” this 
score reflected Sipala’s objective analysis of Anthony’s performance.  Thus, no evidence 
in the record supports Anthony’s allegation that Corbett’s recommendation to Prindle was 
tainted by discriminatory animus. 
                                                 
 2 Although Wasenius received an even lower score that year—“requires 
development”—Sipala explained that this score is given to all employees in their first 
year.  In fact, Anthony received the same low rating during her first year at Duff & 
Phelps, LLC. 
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of the individuals with whom Prindle spoke was White.  Such “unsupported assertions, 
speculation, and conclusory allegations are insufficient to withstand a motion for 
summary judgment.”  Nelson v. DeVry, Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38161, *27-28 (E.D. 
Pa. Apr. 23, 2009).  Thus, we find no “causal link” between White’s alleged bias and 
Prindle’s decision to terminate Anthony. 
 As the District Court found, the record contains no evidence that Anthony’s 
termination was based on anything other than the “utilization data” and her overall 
competency score.  Thus, the District Court did not err in holding that Anthony failed to 
establish a prima facie case of discrimination.  Accordingly, we will affirm the District 
Court’s summary judgment.3
                                                 
 3 Because we hold that Anthony failed to make out a prima facie case of 
discrimination, we need not consider her assertion that the “economic” justification for 
her layoff was pretextual.  Moreover, where a plaintiff fails to make out a prima facie 
case of discrimination under McDonnell-Douglas, “there is no basis to allow the plaintiff 
to proceed on a mixed motive theory.”  Sulit v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Phil., 2009 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 77699, at *21 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 2009). 
 
